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Who Shall We Admit to Our Club?
by Professor Lawrence Raful
“Please accept my resignation.  I don’t care to belong to any
club that will accept me as a member.”
Groucho Marx, The Groucho Letters (1967)
The Nebraska Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Illinoishave recently denied petitions from prospective applicants tothe bar because each appellant failed to satisfy the respective
state’s character and fitness requirements.  On first reading of the
two cases, I was troubled by the standards used, and so this article
is an attempt, as much as anything, for me to work out in my mind
how I feel about the positions each Court has taken in these cases.
You’re invited to join me on this little excursion.
The Nebraska Supreme Court, in In re Application of Converse, 258
Neb. 159 (1999), affirmed the decision of the Nebraska State Bar
Commission to deny Paul Converse’s request to take the 1998
Nebraska bar examination.  Converse graduated from the University
of South Dakota Law School and applied to sit for the bar exam in
Nebraska, but the Commission denied his request because they
found that he “lacked the requisite moral character for admission.”
Converse, prone to hostile and disruptive behavior in law school,
appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the speech and
conduct upon which the Commission’s denial was based, was
protected by the First Amendment.  The Court reviewed the
Commission’s ruling de novo on the record, and a unanimous court
found that while Converse’s conduct may well be protected by the
First Amendment, the Commission properly considered his conduct as
part of the review.
A recent case from Illinois also focuses on the character and
fitness issues.  The Committee on Character and Fitness for the
Third Appellate District of the Supreme Court of Illinois, with
one dissent, decided in June, 1999 that Matthew Hale, who had
graduated from law school and passed the state bar examination,
did not meet the required character and fitness standards for
admission to the bar.  Hale, an avowed racist and head of a white
supremacist organization, appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court
for a full review of the Committee’s ruling.  The Supreme Court,
with one dissent, on November 12, 1999 denied Hale’s motion for
oral argument and review.
Has the Nebraska Supreme Court excluded an applicant simply
because he was different, perhaps odd, maybe even flamboyant?  Has
the Illinois Supreme Court denied an applicant admission because of
political ideology and protected speech?
Admission to practice law in Nebraska, or in most states, is not
mysterious business. If you graduate from an accredited law school,
score a passing grade on the bar exam, and fulfill the character and
fitness requirements imposed by the state’s highest court, you will be
admitted to the bar.  In legal ethics classes in law school, and in the
textbooks we use in those classes, we don’t spend much time
discussing admission to the bar, because the cases are relatively few
and mostly uninteresting.  The only discussion concerning the
admission to practice standards is centered on what constitutes
acceptable character and fitness.
Prior to this century, admission to the bar was by invitation only -
that is, invitation to those of the proper heritage.  Bar associations
were organized and character and fitness standards were adopted in
large cities in the East to keep people out, not to bring people in.
Italian, Irish, and Jewish immigrants were deterred by such require-
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ments in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, and women and people of color
were ostracized.  However, the opening of
new law schools in the early part of this
century, many of which were designed for
“new Americans,”  (like Creighton, for
instance) hastened access to the bar for
some of those previously excluded.
The U.S. Supreme Court has handed down a
number of significant opinions that have
molded modern bar admission practices.  Two
important principles come from those cases.
The first is that character and fitness
requirements must have a rational rela-
tionship to an attorney’s fitness to practice
law.  Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232 (1957).   Secondly, due
process guarantees must be met in the
determination of character and fitness.
Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S.
96 (1963).  Although it has been chal-
lenged on a number of occasions as a
vague standard, many courts have upheld
the use of the term “good moral character”
as a requirement for admission, if for no
other reason than that the law profession
has used the term for hundreds of years.
One of the most interesting set of cases to
come before the U.S. Supreme Court were
those dealing with oaths and political
beliefs.  While bar associations have never
been as interested in keeping out applicants
who admit to popular but illegal sexual
activity, reckless or perhaps even immoral
financial decisions, and even common
criminal convictions, they were for a time
vigilant in seeking out godless Communists
and others with unpopular political views.  A
“trilogy” of famous Supreme Court cases in
1971 found the middle ground: you can’t
deny admission to practice based on
membership in the Communist Party or other
organizations, but you may ask if the
applicant was a “knowing member” of an
organization which advocated the violent
overthrow of the government, and if so, did
the applicant support that goal.  Further-
more, the cases affirmed that each state may
require an applicant to take an oath of
loyalty to the U.S. Constitution. See Baird v.
State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971), In re
Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971), and Law Students
Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v.
Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
Against that brief background of cases about
admission to practice law, let’s look at the
applications of Converse and Hale.
The Nebraska State Bar Commission
investigation revealed that Converse, in the
words of the Court, is “prone to turbulence,
intemperance, and irresponsibility, charac-
teristics which are not acceptable in one
seeking admission to the Nebraska Bar.”
Converse, in his mid-40’s while in law
school, clearly was not a model law student.
He vigorously wrote letters of protest and
appeal to administrators, professors,
newspapers, and judges. He called on
students to adopt his disquieting views on
numerous matters in the law school, and he
accused faculty and deans of deceit,
censorship, incompetence, and arrogance.
While at times Converse had open to him
certain administrative grievances proce-
dures, he admitted that he routinely failed to
use those procedures.
As a foundation for this decision, the Court
relied on a similar denial of admission in an
earlier case.  In re Appeal of Lane, 249 Neb.
499 (1996). The Court characterized
Converse in the same manner as it had
described Lane: “disruptive, hostile,
intemperate, threatening, and turbulent.”
The Court noted that it seeks to find
applicants who can prove their “honesty,
reliability, diligence, and trustworthiness.”
And the Court, citing some of the U.S.
Supreme Court cases mentioned above,
noted that neither requiring an applicant to
answer questions about previous behavior,
nor the resulting investigation into those
acts, is an infringement of a person’s
constitutional rights.
Even more to the point, the Court went out
of its way to make sure that Converse knew
that it was not denying his application
because of what he said, not because of the
letters he sent, not because of the newspa-
pers columns he published, not because of
the nude picture he insisted on posting in
his study carrel, and not even because of the
rude t-shirt with the caricature of the dean
which he distributed.  No, Mr. Converse, the
Court wrote, we are not denying your
petition because of your thoughts, but
because of your deeds.  Converse’s failing
was his humiliating and intimidating
Continued on page11
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personal attacks on institutions and
individuals with which he has disputes.
The Court seeks applicants and lawyers who
practice with self-restraint and seek to
resolve disputes in a peaceful manner.
Contrast Converse with Hale of Illinois.
Matthew Hale is Supreme Leader of the
World Church of the Creator, an organization
based on white supremacy and hatred of
Jews, blacks and other people of color.  Hale
disavows violence and the forcible overthrow
of the government. His church seeks to have
members gain power through lawful,
political, peaceful means, and once in power,
it would organize the deportation of all
people of color and all Jews.
Hale stated that he would affirm the oath to
support the Constitution, although he would
seek to have current interpretations revised.
He would also support the Illinois ethics
code, treating in a nondiscriminatory
manner all lawyers, judges, clients and
witnesses regardless of race or religion.
Again, he stated that he would seek to have
that particular section revised in accordance
with his views.  Evidence before the
committee confirmed his testimony that
while in law school, he had assisted, without
racial animus, African American clients.
The Committee denied Hale’s request for
admission.  It started by working its way
through the now famous “trilogy” of 1971
U.S. Supreme Court cases (see above),
appropriately citing Baird v. Arizona for the
proposition that a state is prohibited from
“excluding a person from a profession or
punishing him solely because he is a
member of a particular political organization
or because he holds certain beliefs.”  But
then it makes a glacier-sized leap that the
difference between Baird and Hale is that
the petitioner in Baird held views in secret,
while Hale espouses his views publicly.
(Quite frankly, I didn’t follow that line of
reasoning.)
The Committee declared that the Bar and the
courts stand for certain “fundamental
truths,” although since it posited these
truths in this opinion and failed to cite any
public document or court decision which
institutionalizes these precepts, I must
wonder if these are “fundamental truths” or
simply value judgements of this particular
group of people.  It invokes the name of
Thomas Jefferson to stand for the proposi-
tion that all men are created equal, and
therefore it cannot let Hale destroy that
value.  Of course, if you want to play
“dueling Jefferson quotes,” you can also
quote our third President when he said in
his inaugural address: “If there be any
among us who would wish to dissolve this
Union or to change its republican form,
let them stand undisturbed as monuments
of the safety with which error of opinion
may be tolerated where reason is let free
to combat it.”
The Committee finally rested its decision on
the proposition that the fundamental truths
that it identified “must be preferred over
the values found in the First Amendment.”
It finds support for this decision because
the Supreme Court allowed enhanced
penalties for hate crimes in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1992), which it
interprets to mean that protecting society
from this type of harm (racial hatred)
trumps an individual’s First Amendment
rights.  But the Committee has mis-read the
opinion, and it is a mistake to base the
Committee’s result on Wisconsin v. Mitchell.
The U.S. Supreme Court overturned a hate
crimes statute in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377 (1992) and then later upheld
the Wisconsin hate crimes statute, but the
differences in the two cases are most
enlightening when using them to discuss
bar admission standards.  R.A.V. described
the burning of a cross by white teenagers on
the lawn of a black family that lived across
the street from the petitioner.  The teens
were charged with violation of a St. Paul city
ordinance, a so-called “Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance” which provided that whoever
places symbols “which one knows or has a
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger,
alarm or resentment in others on the basis of
Continued from page 9
Continued on page  12
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Continued from 11
of race, color . . . shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor.”  Justice Scalia, writing for a
somewhat fractured court, disagreed with St.
Paul’s characterization of this statute as a
“fighting words” ordinance (I am sure you
remember Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
from Con Law class).   Rather, he explained,
the statute applies the fighting words
formula only to those words that provoke
hostility based on race, color, etc., i.e.
“specified disfavored topics.”  Scalia wrote
that the Constitution “does not permit St.
Paul to impose special prohibitions on those
speakers who express views on disfavored
subjects.”  Further, he noted:
“. . . the reason why fighting words
are categorically excluded from the protec-
tion of the First Amendment is not that
their content communicates any particular
idea, but that their content embodies a
particularly intolerable (and socially
unnecessary) mode of expressing whatever
idea the speaker wishes to convey. “
The Court, only a year later, addressed a
slightly different issue in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell.  This case described a group of
black teens who had just viewed the movie
“Mississippi Burning” and decided that, in
response to the attack in the movie when a
black child is victimized by a white man,
they would attack a white person.  They
went out to the street, observed a white boy
walking towards them, and Mitchell said,
among other things, “There goes a white
boy; go get him.”  They attacked the boy and
a jury convicted Mitchell of aggravated
battery.  However, the jury also found that
Mitchell had selected his victim because of
the boy’s race, and the penalty was in-
creased from two years to seven years under
the Wisconsin penalty enhancement statute.
The statute called for penalty enhancement
when, among other provisions, the assailant
“(I)ntentionally selects the person against
whom the crime . . . is committed . . .
because of the race, religion, color, disabil-
ity, sexual orientation, national origin or
ancestry of that person .  .  .  .”
It would not surprise you that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court denieds the constitutionality
of the statute, basing its decision on the
year-old R.A.V. opinion.  But Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for an unanimous U.S.
Supreme Court, explained that the previous
case was about “bias-motivated hatred” and
an ordinance which “proscribed a class of
fighting words” while the statute in this
case is aimed at conduct unprotected by the
First Amendment. “ Yes, the Chief Justice
said, it’s fine to write a statute that takes
into account inflicting societal harm, but
the statute in this case singled out biased-
inspired conduct, not bias-inspired words.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision
because the penalty enhancement statute
did not violate the defendant’s free speech
rights. The Illinois Committee on Character
and Fitness then incorrectly used Wisconsin
v. Mitchell as a basis for their decision,
because in reality they considered Mr. Hale’s
bias-motivated speech.  The record did not
reflect any bias-motivated criminal conduct.
One last quibble, personal rather than
legal, with the Committee’s decision: in
its eloquent and passionate conclusion,
the majority quotes Justice Robert
Jackson from an important 1943 case
about the Bill of Rights, and then it
reminds us that Justice Jackson was
America’s chief prosecutor at the
Nuremburg war trials. It quotes a para-
graph about Jewish extermination from
William L. Shirer’s famous investigation
of Nazi Germany, The Rise and Fall of the
Third Reich, and they remind us that like
Hale, Hitler, too, gained power legally and
constitutionally, and perhaps like Hitler,
thoughts of extermination may be in
Hale’s future.
Nonsense, utter nonsense, and what’s more,
this is an insult to America!  Germany in
1933 is nothing like American now, or years
ago, or years from now.  Take a look at
Daniel Goldhagen’s marvelous and abso-
lutely chilling masterpiece Hitler’s Willing
Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the
Holocaust.  With all due respect to modern
Germany, the German people of 1933 were
not like any society in American history.
Their mindset, their history, their form of
government, their long held prejudices, and
their weltanschauung had produced a
political ideology that has never been
replicated in American populist views.  To
raise the specter that in the future Matthew
Hale would win wide-spread converts and
duplicate in some way Nazi Germany is not
only insulting to Americans, but it suggests
an abysmal outlook and lack of any confi-
dence in the continuation of the American
way of life.  Sure, we have our nut cases –
the KKK and the Posse Comitatus still live in
our country – but even in our darkest hours,
the legacy of Peter Zenger, John Adams,
Thomas Jefferson, and other heroes of
freedom, lives on.
I don’t speak about the Nazi threat from
isolation.  I know what the Nazi’s did in
World War II, because my mother, a Hungar-
ian, wore the Yellow Star, rode the cattle car
to concentration camps, and ended the war
while barely surviving the now infamous
Helmsbrecht Death March.  My mom will be
troubled when she reads that I am not sure
that we can deny Matthew Hale a license to
practice law, and it pains me even to suggest
that this hate monger should belong to the
same profession as I.  But Mom is an
American citizen now and she understands,
I think, that the Bill of Rights is like no
other document in the history of the world.
If it’s to mean anything, it has to include
scum like Hale.  But I digress.
One member of the Hale panel dissented
from the Committee decision, because until
“there is such conduct, … belief … cannot
be the basis of denial,” and the Rules of
Discipline are the manner to protect the
profession and the public.  And that is the
better use of R.A.V. and Wisconsin v.
Mitchell.  Hale has not broken the law, nor,
supposedly, does he intend to break the law.
Hale intends to support the Constitution
and the rules of professional responsibility.
If, later, Hale’s hateful conduct is based on
hateful thought, then let’s throw the bum
out.  If it’s simply hateful thought, it should
be protected.
Now here’s the real problem I have with the
Hale case: Hale appealed the Committee’s
“I don’t speak about the Nazi
threat from isolation.  I know
what the Nazi’s did in World
War II, because my mother, a
Hungarian, wore the Yellow
Star, rode the cattle car to
concentration camps, and
ended the war while barely
surviving the now infamous
Helmsbrecht Death March.”
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denial to the Illinois Supreme Court.  Many
of us in the legal ethics arena were inter-
ested to see how that court would resolve
this fascinating case.  But amazingly
enough, it whiffed.  Without any opinion,
and with one dissent, it declined to take the
case.  Score one point for the Nebraska
Supreme Court, for it was at least willing to
jump into the odious matter of Paul
Converse’s behavior.
Illinois Supreme Court Justice Heiple wrote
the dissent, a strongly worded viewpoint
that this “constitutional question deserves
explicit, reasoned resolution by this court.”
Heiple mocks the Committee’s opinion that
the Hale case is not about First Amendment
rights with his rejoinder that “to the
contrary, this case clearly impacts  . . . the
first amendment to the federal Constitu-
tion.”  And Heiple worries about the fact
that the Committee denied Hale’s applica-
tion because of what he might do in the
future to violate the rules of professional
conduct.  Heiple believes that the Supreme
Court should take a close look at denial
based on speculation and predictions.  This
dissenter’s view is that this case is of such
“significant constitutional magnitude” that
the Supreme Court of Illinois, which has the
sole power to admit and to disbar, has the
obligation to review this decision.
It’s my view that the Nebraska Supreme
Court got it right.  Conduct is different from
belief, and our Court admitted that even
limited antisocial conduct might not be
enough to deny an applicant’s petition for
admission to our profession.  But Converse
had a history of conduct that we do not
value nor approve, and it’s conduct that’s
more than odd, different, weird or quirky.  If
a lawyer engaged in such conduct, the Bar
Association would undoubtedly instigate a
disciplinary review.  As a matter of fact, you
and I know of attorneys and judges who
have been disciplined for behavior that
mirrors some of Converse’s characteristics.
The Hale case is tougher.  I would have been
happier if the Illinois Supreme Court took
the case on review.  I would have been even
happier if it could have crafted an opinion
that kept Hale from our profession, but I’m
not certain it’s possible.  The Committee’s
decision is weak and leaves me unfulfilled.
I don’t admit to being a First Amendment
scholar, but the line of reasoning just
doesn’t lay a strong foundation for me to
believe that it is denying his application for
something other than political ideology.  And
if that’s what it is really doing, whether it
knows it or not, it’s unconstitutional.
“It’s my view that the
Nebraska Supreme Court got
it right.  Conduct is different
from belief, and our Court
admitted that even limited
antisocial conduct might not
be enough to deny an
applicant’s petition for
admission to our profession.”
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